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SECTION 22 UNCONSCIONABILITY - A 
SAUROPOD IN NEED OF LIFE SUPPORT 
 
 





The Full Federal Court decision in Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd (2009) 
 
178   FCR   57;   ATPR   ¶42-294   represents   a   step   back   towards   an   era   where 
unconscionable conduct was not allowed to impinge on commercial certainty. Of the four 
judges who heard this matter three different approaches to the relationship of what is 
now s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law to s 243 were given. The paper concludes that 
the primary judge Rares J was the only one of the quartet who got it right. The other 
three approaches impose, using the criterion of causation, restrictive barriers on the 
operation of s 22 unconscionability. Regrettably, with the High Court refusing special 
leave to appeal and in the absence of any suitable test case to explore the parameters, s 
22 remains underutilised and under threat of being cast in the same light as the sauropod 
 
– an assumption that it looms large in weight and height but in the absence of anyone 
sighting it, presumed extinct. For this reason, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission is urged to identify an appropriate test case to explore the limits of s 22. If 
this is not done urgently, the present narrow, confining operation of the legislation will 
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Introduction 
 
Section 22 of the Australian Consumer Law provide as follows: 
(1)A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with: 
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to another person 
(other than a listed public company); or 
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from another 
person (other than a listed public company); 





The initial  equivalent  to  this  provision,  first  inserted  more than  a decade  ago2   was 
designed  to  address  and  overcome  the  advantages  provided  to  those  with  super 
bargaining strength, particularly property owners in relation to shopping centre tenants 
and  franchisors  and  their  bond  to  franchisees.3   In  essence,  it  articulates  a  norm  of 
conduct, with a recognised purpose of protecting the small business consumer,4 relief 
available even though loss may be minimal.5  Unlike s 20, and more expansively than s 
21,  a non-exhaustive list of factors6 is provided to assist the court in determining whether 
 
the conduct is unconscionable, this ‘principled discretion’7  alleviating the legal 
professions  conservative  fear  of  unbridled  judicial  subjectivity  and  creativity.  With 
judges to date defining unconscionability by way of recourse to dictionary definitions 
with generically unhelpful statements such as ‘”very unfair”, “very unreasonable”, 
“against  conscience”,  or  “moral  obloquy”  being  the  determinants  of  unconscionable 




1 The decision considered s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974. This is now s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law. The Australian 
Consumer Law is Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
2 Trade Practices Amendment (Fair Trading) Act 1998. 
3  For a discussion of the history behind reforms to retail tenancy, see Eileen Webb, “The Productivity Commission Inquiry Report: The 
market for retail tenancy leases in Australia” (2009) APLJ Lexis 22. 
4 Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 FCR 110; ATPR ¶41-879, [115]. 
5 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leelee Pty Ltd (2000) ATPR ¶41, 742, 40,600. 
6 See s 22(1) & (2) of the Australian Consumer Law. 
7 Liam Brown, “The Impact of Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) on Commercial Certainty”, (2004) 28 Melb. U. L. Rev. 
589, 597. 
8 Peter Strickland, “Rethinking unconscionable conduct under the Trade Practices Act”, (2009) 37 ABLR 19, 19 
9 eg. Qantas Airways v Cameron (1996) 66 FCR 246, 283 (pejorative moral judgement); ASIC v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 132 
(against good conscience). 
10 For a discussion of the criticisms of what is now s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law, particularly in relation to shopping centre leases, 
see generally, Eileen Webb, “Almost a decade on – A (Reid) report card on retail leasing”, (2006) APLJ Lexis 7. See also Frank Zumbo, 
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successful11  and the subject of much academic musing.12  However, the purpose of this 
debate is not to traverse the limiting judicial pronouncements or the commentary on the 
legislative deficiencies - this already done more than adequately.13 Its intent is primarily 
to consider the primary judge and the Full Federal Court decision in Allphones Retail Pty 
Ltd  v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd,14  and to ask which of the four judges that heard the matter 
correctly  interpreted  the  connection  and  relationship  between  s  22  (the  normative 
standard) with s 243 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (see also s 87 of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010) (its remedial conclusion) and requirement with this 
latter section that to recover, the loss or damage must be caused by the unconscionable 
conduct.15  It is respectfully suggested that it was the unique circumstances of this case 
that led the High Court to reject special leave to appeal but that they should a similar 
manner be reheard again, the error evident in the majority judgement in Allphones will, or 
at least should, be overturned. The conclusion is that the full Federal Court majority 
judgement of Goldberg and Jacobson JJ unnecessarily and severely limited the operation 
of s 22. If this decision is allow to stand, s 22 is not the elephant in the room (heavy, 
weighty and very visible), but the converse, the sauropod16  – large, slow moving, and 







The Context – The Australian Consumer Law: s 22 and its remedial bedfellow, s 243 
 
Relevantly for present purposes, s 243 provides that where a person has suffered loss or 
 
damage because of conduct of another person that was in contravention of s 22, then the 
 
 
“Promoting ethical business conduct: The case for reforming section 51AC”, (2008) 16 TPLJ 132; Ross Buckley, “Sections 51AA and 
51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for Reform”, (2000) 8 TPLJ 5, 15. 
11  Michelle Sharpe and Christine Parker, “A bang or a whimper? The impact of ACCC unconscionable conduct enforcement”, (2007) 15 
TPLJ 139. 
12 Frank Zumbo, “Promoting ethical business conduct: The case for reforming section 51AC”, (2008) 16 TPLJ 132; Strickland, above note 
8, 19; Mathew Lees, “Contract, Conscience, Communitarian Conspiracies and Confucius: Normativism through the Looking Glass of 
Relational Contract Theory”, (2001) 25 Melb. U. L. Rev. 82 
13 See above the articles cited in footnotes 10-12. 
14 Hoy Phones Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 810; (Primary Judge Rares J); Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd 
(2009) 178 FCR 57; ATPR ¶42-294 (FFC – Goldberg, Jacobson JJ. (majority); Perram J (dissent on one point)); 
15 It should be noted that the action was brought under the equivalent provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 – these being s 51AC and s 
87. For the purposes of this article, the equivalent provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 will be cited throughout (ss 22 and 
243 of the Australian Consumer Law, s 87 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010). 
16 The most widely known sauropod were the huge brontosaurs – the largest of which were up to 30 metres in length and could weigh up 
to 80 tons. They could only move at a top speed of 16 kilometres an hour. “Dinosaurs”, 17 Encyclopaedia Britannica, (15th edition, 1992), 315, 
321 
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Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate.17 This proposition is only noteworthy 
for how unremarkable it is – the loss or damage that is recoverable is only that caused by 
the unconscionable conduct. In stark terms, the unconscionable conduct must be causative 
of the loss. ‘Unconscionable dealing tracks the power norm’18  and when this norm goes 
beyond the judicially crafted understanding of what this means, s 243 can deliver the 
remedial relief craved for by the oppressed litigant. The catalyst of s 22 delivers the 
outcome of s 243. The court is making a finding, somewhat imprecise and possibly 
subjective that one or more persons should be held liable for the losses occasioned upon 
another. The creative and nebulous nature of this inquiry shadowed by a High Court 
willing to appeal to ‘common sense’ as the legal criterion through which one is satisfied as 
to whether the act or event in issue materially causes the damage imposed on the 
unsuspecting plaintiff,19  even when they reiterate that in the statutory context that they 
must  loyally  ‘carry into  force  the  objects  of  the  legislation,  as  understood  from  the 
language and structure of the statutory text.’20 As French CJ notes in the 2009 decision of 
Campbell v Backhouse21  (a case on what is now s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law), 
though the comment is equally applicable to s 22), that whilst it is ‘logically anterior’ to 
consider   whether   the   conduct   was   misleading   or   deceptive   [of   which   we   add, 
unconscionable] to that of causation, ‘In so saying, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
there may be practical overlaps in the resolution of these logically distinct questions. The 
characterisation of conduct may involve assessment of its notional effects, judged by 
reference to its context. The same contextual factors may play a role in determining 
causation.’22 In so doing, the courts are cognisant that logic will not necessarily deliver a 
 
result unchallengeable, that at the end of the day, practicality, policy and value judgements 
 
will  play  a  central  function.23 
 
The  question  raised  by  Allphones  was  thus:  For 
 




17 It should be noted that prior to the introduction of the Australian Consumer Law, the conjunctive was ‘by’ and this still remains in s 87. 
Little is made of this difference. Section 243 of the Australian Consumer refers back to ss 237 and 238 of the Australian Consumer Law and 
these sections use the term ‘because’. 
18 Lees, above n 12, 96. 
19  I&L Securities v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd (2002) 210 CLR 109; Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459; and March v Stramare (E 
&MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506. 
20 Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 645, 
21 (2009) 257 ALR 610. 
22 Ibid, [24]. 
23 A point recognised by French J. (as he then was) in Pavich v Bobra Nominees Pty Ltd [1988] ATPR (Digest) 46-039. 
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oppressive behaviour directly, inexorably, and indisputably feed into the loss occasioned 
on the plaintiff. In Allphones, four judges provided three different responses,  and in the 
view of these authors, it is the judgement of the primary judge, Rares J that was correct. 
The majority judgement of Goldberg and Jacobson JJ lacking an appreciation of the role s 
22 is to play, with the other appellate judge Perram J (whilst coming to the same final 








Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd 
 
Allphones is a franchisor. The respondent was one of its franchisees. It operated a store in 
the Westfield Shopping Centre in Eastgardens, Sydney. Unlike many other 
telecommunication franchises, Allphones was not tied to any particular carrier – for this 
reason, an Allphones franchisee was able to arrange a broader range of services than its 
competitors were. The relationship between the parties became dysfunctional,24 with three 
aspects to the dispute: 
 
• First, Hoy was entitled to receive from the franchisor 72.5% of any mobile 
telephone sales commission. As part of a promotion, Optus agreed that for 
every new phone activation, Allphones would receive a ‘stretch’ bonus 
payment of $150. Allphones did not regard this as something that would 
attract the 72.5% commission. Hoy Mobile disagreed. 
 
• The second dispute concerned renewal of Optus phone contracts. Allphones 
would canvass Optus customers seeking to have them renew their telephone 
contracts. When his occurred, Optus would pay Allphones a bonus of $30 – 
none of which was passed on to Hoy. However, if the customer did renew, 
the commission of 72.5% continued to be paid to the franchisee. In so doing, 






24 As described by Rares J Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) ATPR 42-240; [2008] FCA 810, [425]. 
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fee of $11 should there be a new handset. Hoy Mobile considered that these 
deductions should not have been made. 
 
• The third area of dispute was a decision by Allphones to deduct fees owed to 
Hoy Mobile on the basis that Hoy Mobile would ‘refresh’ the look of the 
store. Again, Hoy considered that Allphones could not compel a change of 
store appearance and in any event, disputed the amount that Allphones had 
deducted. 
 
Behind these, what objectively might be considered as minor financial discord between a 
franchisor and a franchisee, lay a dispute that was far more poisonous and which was in 
someway masked by the this context. Hoy Mobile had fraudulently unlocked mobile 
phones. This is a practise where a phone that was to be linked to a particular carrier was 
unlocked whereby the phone could then be attached to any particular telecommunications 
company.  When  this  fraud  came  to  the  attention  of  Allphones,  the  franchise  was 
terminated  based  on  the  contractual  right  contained  within  clause  9.3(viii)  of  the 
agreement that the franchisor could terminate if the franchisee engaged in fraudulent 
practices. The context in which this occurred however, was a judicial acceptance and 
acknowledgement that Allphones had acted deceitfully,25  oppressively and engaged in 
 
overt bullying of the franchisee.26 Some of these darker allegations consisted of a failure 
to address the substance of the correspondence provided by the franchisee, making 
threatening and unjustifiable demands as well as indicating that the franchisee had no 
tenure in that position.27 
The decision of the primary judge, Rares J28 
 
 
Rares J found as a matter of law that Allphones had no entitlement to deduct the stretch 
bonus with the franchisor being aware of this. For this reason, Allphones had repudiated 
the agreement. Similarly, Rares J considered that Allphones was not entitled to make the 
renewal  deductions,  and  whilst  it  was  entitled to  charge for store refresh  costs,  the 
amount deducted was not reasonable. Finally, even though Hoy Mobile was guilty of 
 
 
25 (2008) ATPR 42-240, [406]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 (2008) ATPR 42-240; [2008] FCA 810. 
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fraudulently unlocking the phones, as Allphones were not in a position to perform the 
agreement, they could not therefore rely on the express power of termination in the 
franchise arrangement. Such rights could only be exercised by parties under an agreement 
that were ready, willing, and able to perform that agreement.29  Rares J then went on to 
find that s 22 was triggered because of Allphones’ conduct generally; the bullying and 
oppressive conduct previously canvassed made it unconscionable for the termination to 
proceed. For these reasons, Allphones had engaged in unconscionable conduct and an 
order was made to pay Hoy Mobile the sum of $52,893.35, and an injunction was granted 
under what was then s 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (see now ss 87, of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, 243 of the Australian Consumer Law) preventing 
the termination of an agreement. 
 
 
The approach here of Rares J is intriguing, but one we would suggest is correct. The 
judge could simply have examined the termination issue separately, without resort to s 
22. Indeed, on appeal it was queried why resort was had to s 22 at all30. Nevertheless, it is 
 
suggested that Rares J was clearly looking at a wider reach of s 22 - one that took into 
account, but could override the express terms of the contract and which implicitly 
recognises and understands the nuances of remedial intervention into the contract that s 
22 and s 243 would allow on any plain reading. His Honour noted that s 22 permits the 
Court to take a broader view of the whole of the relationship and assess conduct in that 
broader context.31 As noted: 
 
 
One purpose of [s 22] was to set a norm of conduct for corporations acting in trade 
or commerce…The second reading speech stated that this norm of conduct had the 
purpose of protecting the legal rights of small businesses and ensuring that they 
could confidently deal with large firms…[Whilst] equity would not find a nexus 









29 (2008) ATPR 42-240 ; [2008] FCA 810, [385]. 
30 (2009) 178 FCR 57, [24]. 
31 (2008) ATPR 42-240 ; [2008] FCA 810, [419] 
Page 8 of 17  
engaged…But, [s 22] authorises the Court to look more broadly at the whole of the 
 
relationship and to assess the corporation’s conduct in that broader context.32 
 
 
In the view of Rares J, the context included Allphones' breaches of the franchise 
agreement, which were the basis of the finding that Allphones was not entitled to 
terminate. Rares J also specifically referred to other conduct engaged in by Allphones 
that was relevant under s 22. 
 
 
Allphones  was not willing to carry out the franchise agreement honestly or in 
good faith according to its terms. Both parties have been in default of their 
obligations, both contractual and moral, towards one another in the conduct of the 
relationship. I have had regard to all of the circumstances, including  Allphones ’ 
conduct leading up to the notice of intention to terminate, and the consequences 
on   Hoy Mobile  of  a  termination.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  it  would  be 
unconscientious for Allphones  to insist upon its strict legal rights to force an 
immediate termination in all the circumstances where the performance of its own 
obligations under the franchise agreement has been lamentably and dishonestly 
short of the standards that it ought to have followed. It engaged in unjustified 






On appeal, it was noted regarding this statement: 
 
It is, I think, impossible to read this other than as a finding that the decision to 
terminate pursuant to cl 9.3(viii) was unconscionable. The primary judge’s 
conclusion was not that the misappropriation of the commissions was 
unconscionable. Rather it was that termination of the agreement in light of all the 
circumstances would be unconscionable. Those circumstances were the dishonest 
retention  of  commission  by  Allphones, the  dishonest  unlocking  of  phones 





33 (2008) ATPR 42-240;  [2008] FCA 810, [427]. 
9 Ibid,  [26]. 
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dysfunctional   nature   of   the   relationship   and   the   grave   consequences 
to  Hoy  Mobile if the agreement were terminated. Once that is accepted, as I 
think it must be, it is plain that the injunction had the effect of preventing the loss 
and damage to Hoy  Mobile caused by that conduct, that is, caused by the 




The Appeal (Goldberg and Jacobson JJ (majority); Perram J (minority)) 
 
On appeal the two crucial issues were: 
 
• the accuracy of Rares J’s conclusions regarding Allphones inability to be ready 
and willing to complete given their repudiation of their obligations under the 
franchise agreement right to terminate; and 
 
• whether it was appropriate for the injunction to have been issued via s 243 for a 






At the outset, the brief majority judgement of Goldberg, and Jacobson JJ should be 
distinguished from that of Perram J. In the authors’ view the majority took, with respect, 
an incorrect approach to the issue at hand, as they regarded the termination issue and the 
s 22 issue as virtually the same. Therefore, once they decided that the express clause 
could  be  relied  upon  by  Allphones,  and  that  there  was  no  causal  nexus  between 
Allphones  otherwise  inappropriate  conduct  and  the  decision  to  terminate  for  Hoy 
Mobile’s fraud, the unconscionability issue fell away. The majority considered that s 243 
could not be engaged unless the conduct was causative of the loss. ‘[If] Allphones did not 
cause  or  contribute  to  the  fraudulent  conduct  which  gave  rise  to  its  entitlement  to 
terminate the agreement, there could be no causal connection between the circumstances 
complained of under [s 22] and the termination of the agreement.’35  Accordingly, the 
 




34 (2009) 178 FCR 57, [86]. 
35 Ibid, 7]. 
36 Ibid,  [26]. 
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authors are in disagreement with this limiting and narrow approach. The legislation is 
clear, the objectives easily understand. Section 22 establishes a norm of conduct for 
business, unconscionability is to be considered in all the circumstances. The status and 
circumstances involving the exercise of the express term and the s 22 issues are 
completely separate. While the former may be taken into account in assessing the latter, 
the conclusion regarding the express term, that it was operational, does not jettison the s 
22 issue. To do this has not merely ameliorated the effect of s 22, but has allowed 
commercial behaviour that was uniformly accepted as oppressive and unconscionable to 
go unpunished, in essence no penalty for failure to comply with the statutorily demanded 






Perram J  also held that, with regard to the exercise of the contractual right to terminate, 
Allphones were not motivated by any extrinsic purpose or capriciousness to breach any 
duty of good faith. Therefore, the exercise of the right to terminate could not be regarded 
as unconscionable as there was no causal nexus between the allegedly unconscionable 
conduct by Allphones (the commissions) and the unrelated, and legitimate decision to 
terminate. Despite this, his Honour, correctly, it is asserted, treated the s 22 issue quite 
separately. Unlike the majority, Perram J did not disagree with Rares J conclusion that 
the termination was unconscionable, prevention possible by the issuing of an injunction 
under s 243. Perram J noted that Allphones’ contention was that the unconscionable 
conduct identified by Rares J consisted of the wrongful retention of commission; there 
was no alternative argument that the conclusion that the termination was unconscionable 
should itself be set aside.36 Therefore, there was no occasion to assess whether Allphones 
behaviour was unconscionable. Nevertheless, Perram J did go on to make the following 
statement: 
 
I would not, however, wish necessarily to be seen as endorsing an approach to 
that question which downplays the fact that the termination of the agreement was 
not causally connected to the oppressive behaviour of Allphones . There may be 
37 Ibid,  [87]. 
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much to be said for the idea that the circumstances referred to in  [s 22] include 
notions of causation. So viewed, it may be necessary to ask what the logical 
connexion is between any particular circumstances identified for the purposes of 
[s 22] and the conclusion that the impugned conduct is unconscionable. Unless 
such an approach is taken there is a real risk that the conclusion that conduct is 
unconscionable "in all the circumstances" ceases to be a statement that a norm 
required  by  the   Act  has  been  breached  and  becomes  instead  a  remedial 
conclusion thought to be appropriate by reason of the particular constellation of 
circumstances.  However,  there  having  been  no  direct  attack  on  the  primary 
judge’s conclusion that the conduct was unconscionable, it is not appropriate that 
I take the matter any further.37 (emphasis added) 
 
 
Perram J’s views should be examined with regard to: 
 
 
• The separate treatment of the termination issue and the unconscionability issue; 
 
• Whether a causal nexus should restrain s 22; 
 






First, it is suggested that the contractual issue should be kept quite separate from the 
operation of s 22. Section 22 promotes a norm of conduct with which corporations and 
persons must comply. Even though, in isolation, the exercise of the contractual right of 
termination was not exercised based on any impugned conduct on Allphones’ part, this is 
just one of the many circumstances making up a consideration of unconscionable conduct 
in this particular context. It should not be permissible to use an isolated circumstance to, 
artificially it is suggested, prevent consideration of the wider context and operation of s 
22. 




Second, the fact that there was, fortuitously for Allphones, no causal link between the 
express right of termination and Hoy Mobile’s fraud, should not automatically absolve 
Allphones from its other instances of oppressive business conduct; the majority should 
not have jumped to a conclusion that the conduct was not unconscionable. The basis of 
the injunction under s 243 was much wider than the express right; indeed, in Rares J’s 
view the two issues were quite separate, to the extent that given that decision on the 
termination point,  Rares J need not have proceeded to consider s 22. 
 
Section 22 requires an examination of all the circumstances and, if it was determined 
after consideration of those circumstances that the conduct was unconscionable remedies 
will follow. If a remedy is granted, because overall the conduct is unconscionable, the 
fact that the most appropriate remedy may override the operation of an express term that 
is unaffected by the otherwise unconscionable behaviour is simply a fact. In this case, 
although there was no a causal nexus between Allphones unconscionable conduct and its 
decision to terminate, there was conduct which, in all the circumstances, seemed to be 
regarded by Rares J as sufficiently unconscionable to justify the grant of the injunction. 
Although it is not clear on the face of the case, the only way that Rares J could have 
reached this decision is by assessing the overall conduct, including a consideration of the 
existence of the express term and Hoy Mobile’s fraudulent conduct, and determining it 
was unconscionable. Only then would the remedy be available. 
 
Perram J’s concern was that there must be a logical connection between the conduct and 
the remedy sought – otherwise s 22 would cease to be a provision establishing a norm of 
conduct, but a remedial conclusion in itself, the bedfellow of s 243 would presumably 
merely be a procedural adjunct. But, it is suggested, that Rares J did find that connection. 
There was a logical ligation between the instances of Allphones (in particular the non- 
payment of commissions and the bullying and uncooperative behaviour) and a finding of 
unconscionable conduct. Although references were made to the termination being 
unconscionable, it is suggested that this was the remedial conclusion (i.e. the most 
appropriate remedy on the facts) which could only be available reaching a conclusion that 
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in all the circumstances, Allphones conduct, including the existence of the express clause, 
 




It seems even if the express clause had been held by Rares J to be 
 
valid,  His  Honour  could  have  continued  with  the  discussion  of  s  22  anyway.  The 
remedial conclusion is only justifiable by breach of the norm, which is done by the 
constellation of circumstances. Rares J’s judgment does not undermine the requirement 
for a causal nexus. 
 
Effect on interpretation of s 22 
 
 
Unfortunately, the application for special leave to the High Court on this issue has been 
refused. 39     The   special   leave   application   was   based   on   the   termination   and 
unconscionability issues. In relation to the termination, French CJ and Gummow J were 
of the view that the issue was one of construction of the particular clause and it was 
unnecessary to revisit the ‘ready and willingness’ issues examined at first instance and on 
appeal. 40 
 
The  unconscionability  point  is  intriguing.  Counsel  for  Hoy  Mobile  stressed  the 
difficulties in which would be experienced in the interpretation of s 22 if the decision of 
the majority of the Full Court stood.41 Indeed, this contention caused French CJ to query 
if the majority’s approach had the effect of limiting s 22 to equitable notions.42  It was 
contended that the majority’s interpretation would limit s 22 to the common law and, if 
this were correct, there would be no more work for s 22 to do in respect of termination. 
 
Special leave was not granted but it is worthwhile noting French CJ’s comments in full: 
 
 
The Full Court also decided, by majority, that the exercise by Allphones of its 
 
contractual right to terminate could not constitute conduct that was 
 
 
38 We submit that the approach described at (2009) 178 FCR 57, [86] is the correct one, namely, that one looks at the conduct in relation to 
a termination to see whether the termination would be unconscionable. Then in terms of the causation element, one can say that it would 
be likely to produce loss or damage if the party unconscionably seeking to exercise a right of termination were to go ahead and do it and 
that livens the 87 remedy. That, we submit, is the correct approach. 
39 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2009] HCATrans 325. 
40 The power of Allphones to terminate its contract with Hoy Mobile was conferred by the terms of the written agreement between them. 
The conclusion reached by the Full Court that the power was not qualified by anterior repudiation of the contract by the terminating party 
is not, in our opinion, attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of special leave. 
41 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2009] HCATrans 325, lines 10-90. 
42 Ibid, line 95. 
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unconscionable for the  purposes  of section [22] of the [Australian Consumer 
Law] . Without endorsing all that was said by the Full Court in the circumstances 
which gave rise to Allphones’ contractual power to terminate, an appeal against 
this decision has insufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special 
leave. (Emphasis added) 
 
It is suggested that the failure to grant special leave in this case was based on Hoy’s 
ultimate prospects of success. The franchisee had behaved fraudulently, and although s 
22 does not require parties to come ‘with clean hands’ it is suggested that Hoy was a 
 
‘weak’ prospect and perhaps, in the High Courts view, an undeserving one. More 
importantly, the High Court did not endorse the Full Court’s view regarding the 
circumstances involving the power to terminate. This can only refer to the majority’s 
view on the unconscionability point as, on this issue, the majority diverged from Perram 
J. This suggests that the upholding of the express right of termination will not jettison the 
s  22  considerations.  But,  unfortunately,  more  cases  will  be  required  to  achieve  an 
ultimate answer. In some respects, this refusal by French CJ (along with Gummow J) to 
grant special leave was somewhat surprising. French J (as he then was) in the first 
instance decision in Berbatis43  promoting an expansive  view of unconscionability with 
 
the possibility that this doctrine would unify various equitable tenets such as estoppel, 
unjust enrichment, economic duress and unilateral mistake,44 with the recognition that is 
parameters are “normative rather than logical”.45 Given this we may have thought that as 
the Chief Justice in the High Court, the opportunity presented by Allphones to reverse the 
restrictive constraints placed on the doctrine by the then majority of the High Court in 
Berbatis46 would have been too strong to resist. As readers will recall, in that matter the 
 
High Court refused to accept that mere inequality of bargaining power, or the lack of any 
expectation of a right of renewal of a lease, or the hard, uncompromising bargain of the 
stronger party could amount to special disadvantage. Callinan J. summing up what these 




43 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 96 FCR 491; 169 ALR 324. 
44 Ibid, [25], see also Ross Buckley, “Sections 51AA and 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for Reform”, (2000) 8 TPLJ 5, 
15. 
45 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 96 FCR 491, [25]. 
46 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
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amounting to unconscionable conduct…is far too broad and imprecise to be accepted in 
this Court.’47  Perhaps Allphones, with the conduct of the franchisee under examination, 
and despite the dramatic and drastic consequences for the franchisee was simply not the 
vehicle to revisit what the majority had said. 
 
 
Section 22 offers considerable potential. It clearly requires a normative analysis,48  and 
demands of the curial discretion that consideration be given to the behaviour of the 




is clear, explicit and should be heeded, concern as to uncertainty and 
 






The then Justice French, writing extra judicially, described common law causes of action 
when compared with misleading and deceptive conduct as a “slow-growing sauropod.”50 
Today, and when unconstrained by curial conservatism, the now Chief Justice of the 
High Court may well use a similar analogy to describe s 22 when compared with its 
Jurassic relative, the common law doctrine of unconscionability. However, the decision 
the subject of focus in this paper, unless reversed, may well alter that thinking. Indeed, it 
may be suggested that in the decade of s 22, it has become that sauropod, slowly moving, 
rarely seen and glacially moving towards its extinction. These factors led the Senate 
Standing Committee on Economics to recommend that the ACCC undertake a number of 
test cases,51  to ensure that the legislation rightfully achieves its objectives of fairness in 
 
commercial dealings.52 In the absence of this, however, and to combine an interpretation 
of unconscionable conduct that necessitates moral obloquy with, as Allphones did, with a 
view of causation and connexion to remedial outcome that is extraordinarily narrow 




47 Ibid, 112. 
48 See Lees, above n 12,  107-108. 
49 As noted by Lees, above n 12, 108: “Thus [ss51AA-51AC] aim to reinforce contract norms and can be considered a form of social 
engineering.” 
50 Justice RS French, “A Lawyers Guide to Misleading or Deceptive Conduct: (1989) 63 ALJ 250, 250. 
51 The Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Report on the Need, Scope and Content of a Definition of Unconscionable Conduct for the Purposes of 
Part IVA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, (December, 2008), 39. 
52 See generally, Daniel Clough, “Coexistence of Fairness and Competition under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)”, (2005) 33 ABLR 99. 
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for any interventionist consumer/small business legislation lies in the schism that occurs 
between strong seller/supplier and weak buyer/recipient. Section 22 is directly aimed at 
inducing  ‘behavioural  change’,53   the  conduct  that  occurred  in  Allphones  and  the 
incapacity of Hoy Mobile to realise the value of their investment in the franchise tells us 
starkly that s 22 and its interpretation by the Full Federal Court has failed to deliver on its 
promise. After all, it must be emphasised that the conduct of the franchisor was accepted 
as being oppressive, threatening, and bullying, yet no remedy was available to the 
franchisee. Absent any express provision that corporations must engage in unfair conduct 
(and whilst a question for a different day, it may be queried as to why such a provision 
could not be included, with many jurisdictions having something of this ilk),54 
unconscionability  doctrines  provide  the  next  best  alternative.  With  the  Australian 
economy dominated in many key areas by industry shaped with oligopolistic features, the 
small business owner, (now recognised as vital in a modern economy)55  has no 
opportunity to transact transparently, confidently, and secure in the knowledge that not 
only the process, but the substance of the arrangement has been concluded and engaged 
in a spirit of commercial fairness. Whilst economists may well disagree with consumer 
advocates about the costs and benefits of market intervention, the behaviour of Allphones 
in this litigation should send a salutary message about the value of good faith intervention 
– here was a company able to get away with behaviour that was indisputably 
unconscionable, yet no penalty flowed from that, yet the franchisee had their livelihood 
destroyed. Sadly, the comment of Cornwall-Jones56  shortly after the enactment of s 22 
has not been fulfilled. In 2000, he stated: 
“The  more  recent  addition  of  [s  22  of  the  Australian  Consumer  Law],  which 
extends  the  statutory  prohibition  of  unconscionable  conduct  to  commercial 
contracts, indicates that fairness applies beyond the consumer context. The 
movement  toward  fairness,  referred  to  as  a ‘measured  mutation’ by Seddon  is 




53 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1997, 8801 (Peter Reith, Minister for Workplace 
Relations and Small Business). 
54 See generally Jennifer Martin, “An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protection of Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an 
Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?” (2006) 41 Tex. Int’l L. J. 223 for an overview of global developments. 
55 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1997, 8802 (Peter Reith, Minister for Workplace 
Relations and Small Business). 
56 Jason Cornwall-Jones, “Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct: A Storm in a Teacup?”, (2000) 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 249 
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authors would add here statutory unconscionability] can easily be reconciled with 
 
this evolution of the law, and is to be encouraged.”57 
 
Fairness, justice, morality and no doubt efficiency, fashion the law58 
 
but the overly 
 
technical and doctrinal limiting interpretation by the Full Federal Court in Allphones 
undermines the respect that franchisees like Hoy Mobile would have for our legal 
institutions. The intent of Parliament was clear, the wording explicit, the conclusion 
reached by Rares J appropriate. Allphones engaged in unconscionable conduct – to 
respond  that  this  was  causally  distinct  from  the  power  of  termination  and  was 
independent of the oppressive conduct is to dimidiate behaviour in a way that has no 
commercial or practical reality. The relationship of franchisor and franchisee had become 
dysfunctional  and  to  segregate  some  conduct  into  behaviour  that  was  dishonest, 
oppressive and bullying, but to equally suggest that the power of termination was a 
legitimate exercise of contractual power serves only to undermine the stated intent to the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, and the reasons behind s 22 of the Australian 
Consumer Law. Whatever may the economic costs of intervention, the less quantifiable 
notion of underlying fairness is no less important. Unconscionability is fast becoming the 



























57 Ibid, 275. 
58 For Consideration of on the role of law and economics and the balance needed with notions such as fairness see Sir Anthony Mason, 
“Law and Economics”, (1991) 17 Monash University Law Review 167, 171. 
